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Background: Challenges brought about by developments such as continuing market reforms and budget
reductions have strained the relation between managers and physicians in hospitals. By applying neo-institutional
theory, we research how intra-organizational dynamics between physicians and managers induce physicians to
become entrepreneurs by starting a specialty clinic. In addition, we determine the nature of this change by
analyzing the intra-organizational dynamics in both hospitals and clinics.
Methods: For our research, we interviewed a total of fifteen physicians and eight managers in four hospitals and
twelve physicians and seven managers in twelve specialty clinics.
Results: We found evidence that in becoming entrepreneurs, physicians are influenced by intra-organizational
dynamics, including power dependence, interest dissatisfaction, and value commitments, between physicians and
managers as well as among physicians’ groups. The precise motivation for starting a new clinic can vary depending on
the medical or business logic in which the entrepreneurs are embedded, but also the presence of an entrepreneurial
nature or nurture. Finally we found that the entrepreneurial process of starting a specialty clinic is a process of sedimented
change or hybridized professionalism in which elements of the business logic are added to the existing logic of medical
professionalism, leading to a hybrid logic.
Conclusions: These findings have implications for policy at both the national and hospital level. Shared ownership and
aligned incentives may provide the additional cement in which the developing entrepreneurial values are ‘glued’ to the
central medical logic.
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In the Netherlands, a system of regulated competition
with a mandate for individuals to purchase insurance was
introduced in 2006. In addition, reforms containing ele-
ments from managed competition were implemented as
the former lump-sum financing system was gradually
replaced by a fee-for-service system. This, combined
with the favourable treatment of specialty clinics, caused an
increase in entrepreneurial activities. The number of spe-
cialty clinics (many of which were founded by physician-
entrepreneurs) rose by 62% from 149 in 2007 to 241 in* Correspondence: w.t.koelewijn@utwente.nl
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unless otherwise stated.2010, while the total revenue of these clinics tripled to 315
million euros, equaling roughly 2.5% of the total hospital
budget [1]. These developments were supported by the
Dutch Healthcare Authority, which advocated more spe-
cialty clinics because of their substantially lower charges
compared to hospitals [1], while in addition, the Dutch
Health Care Inspectorate pointed at the positive develop-
ments with regard to the quality of care provided by spe-
cialty clinics [2,3]. In the media as well, specialty clinics
were being welcomed as efficient providers, providing fast
access to patient-oriented care [4-7].
Despite the positive perception of physicians’ entrepre-
neurship as a part of managed competition, it still remained
a relatively rare phenomenon as the vast majority of physi-
cians continued to work in hospitals, leaving the start ofral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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the entrepreneurial ambitions of these physicians re-
sulted in fierce conflicts with hospital management who
felt surprised by their aspirations [8,9]. This triggered
the questions answered in this paper: What drives physi-
cians’ entrepreneurship? In answering this question we
will adopt a neo-institutional perspective focusing on both
contextual- as well as intra-organizational dynamics.
Over time, the rising demand for care, the continuous
stream of technological innovations and health care re-
forms, reinforced by the financial crisis, have strained the
relationship between physicians and managers in many
hospitals [10,11]. This relationship, however, embodies ‘a
critical determinant of the success of health care organiza-
tions’ [12-16].
On a more fundamental level, the relationship between
physicians and managers is influenced by institutional
logics [17], consisting of ‘taken-for-granted rules’; these
are influential in shaping both organizational fields, such
as health care, and the behaviour of organizations, groups,
and individuals working in these fields [18]. In general,
physicians are embedded in the traditional logic of medical
professionalism, which includes values like external orien-
tation and physicians’ autonomy. In contrast, hospital
managers are embedded in the logic of business-like
health care [19], focusing on values such as efficiency, and
performance and quality indicators [17]. These different
logics and accompanying value commitments are compet-
ing for dominance and lead to rivalry between the two
groups. [16,17,19-22].
Neo-institutional theory allows for further analysis of
these rivalries between groups within organizations. In
particular, the framework by Greenwood and Hinings [23]
is well-suited to study intra-organizational dynamics.
Figure 1 depicts how intra-organizational dynamics, con-
sisting of power dependencies, interest dissatisfaction, andFigure 1 Neo-institutional dynamics model based on Greenwood andvalue commitments, may lead to radical organizational
change. Next, we briefly explain our core constructs and
their meaning in a health care context.
The growing dominance of business-like health care at
the expense of the traditional logic of medical profes-
sionalism has altered physicians’ perceived power de-
pendence on management. It has decreased physicians’
autonomy, potentially leading to interest dissatisfaction -
especially for physicians embedded in the logic of med-
ical professionalism. Greenwood and Hinings [23] define
such interest dissatisfaction as ‘the degree of dissatisfac-
tion of groups and individuals with the existing distribu-
tion of resources and their motivation to enhance or
sustain their shares of scarce and valued resources’. An
increase in interest dissatisfaction will influence physi-
cians’ value commitments.
Value commitments vary according to their embed-
dedness in a certain logic [23]. In the case of ‘status-quo
commitment’ and ‘indifferent commitment’ there will
only be limited if any intra-organizational dynamics,
since organizational groups are respectively committed
to the status quo or are indifferent about which logic is
dominant. However, when all organizational groups agree
a change of logic is necessary they have a ‘reformative
commitment’. Alternatively, when one group challenges
the dominance of the logic held by another group there
are ‘competitive commitments’ and there will be strong
intra-organizational dynamics.
A competitive value commitment may be either trans-
formative or defensive in orientation [24]). In the hospital
context, physicians holding a transformative oriented com-
petitive value commitment favour the newly dominant
business logic over the traditionally dominant medical
logic. This contrasts with the opposite situation of phy-
sicians holding a defensively oriented competitive value
commitment.Hinings [15].
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tion, and value commitments can result in ‘radical change’,
which involves abandoning the current dominant logic ra-
ther than fine-tuning it. In this study we define entrepre-
neurship as a form of radical change by physicians (also
see, Koelewijn et al., 2012) [24]. Hereby, entrepreneurship
is defined as ‘new entries by physicians and hospital man-
agers who discover, evaluate, and exploit opportunities to
create future health services by bearing the risk of profit
and loss’ [25-27].
Finally, in analyzing the nature of radical change
towards entrepreneurship, we distinguish between trans-
formational and sedimented change [28]. Whereas trans-
formational change entails the creation of an entirely new
logic, sedimentation suggests that elements from another,
sometimes conflicting, logic may be added to the present
logic. As a result, this type of change remains incomplete
and reversible [29]. Examples of sedimented change are
provided by, for example, Kitchener [30], who applied
Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model in explaining the
introduction of a quasi-market in the UK. He concluded
that this did not lead to a transformational change in the
logics of its actors, but instead to a ‘co-existence of new
structures and systems’. This was supported by Addicott
and Furlie [31] who concluded that in managed clinical net-
works for cancer in London ‘a hybrid interpretive scheme
has prevailed, whereby the characteristics of a range of
conflicting archetypes coexist’. By analyzing the type of
change associated with physicians’ entrepreneurship, we
simultaneously contribute to the stream of literature on
professionalism [32] in which professionalism is defined as
a normative value system and ideology [33].
Methods
In preparing our interview protocol, we made one adapta-
tion to the original model of Greenwood and Hinings
(1996) [23]. As both the dominant logic and the alternative
logic are well defined in our study (business-like health care
and medical professionalism respectively), we focus on both
the physicians’ relative position with respect to the two
logics and on defining their value commitment towards the
other group. For this purpose, the description of the med-
ical logic and business-like logic as developed by Reay and
Hinings [8] was used. Respondents were assigned to one of
the two logics based on their responses to the questions,
which contained statements referring to values of both the
medical logic and the business logic. Respondents who em-
braced values of both logics were assigned to the hybrid
logic. The resulting research model is shown in Figure 1.
We conducted a study among physicians and managers
in both hospitals and specialty clinics. We conducted semi-
structured interviews with fifteen physicians and eight man-
agers in four Dutch hospitals and twelve physicians and
seven managers in twelve Dutch specialty clinics. In total,we interviewed 27 physicians and 15 managers to deter-
mine the intra-organizational dynamics, their contribution
to the level of entrepreneurship, and if any resulting change
was transformational or sedimented.
As indicated in Table 1, the four hospitals and twelve
specialty clinics ranged in size and specialty, thereby con-
stituting a representative sample of hospitals and specialty
clinics in the Netherlands. Per hospital, we selected two
physicians from medical specialties and two from surgical
specialties. Managers were selected for having a direct re-
lation with at least two of the physicians included to allow
for a better understanding of the intra-organizational dy-
namics. For specialty clinics, we focused on including phy-
sicians from clinics of differences sized rather than from
different specialties.
In the interviews, respondents were first informed about
the aim and method of the study. In order to avoid socially
desirable answers as much as possible, they were explicitly
asked to reflect on their actual experiences in their present
situation in the hospital or specialty clinic. The interviews
were audiotaped and transcribed, and then anonymized
for reasons of confidentiality.Data analysis
The interviews were coded and analyzed with the help of
Atlas.ti 6.2. The code list was based the constructs in-
cluded in our research model (Figure 1). New elements
that were mentioned as influencing intra-organizational
dynamics, such as organizational size and personal charac-
teristics, were also included in the code list.
In order to prevent bias, a second coder reviewed the
recorded interviews as well. This resulted in a kappa
of 0.73, showing relatively high inter-coder reliability.
When differences arose, these were discussed; agreement
was reached on all items. We translated the quotations
included in this article from Dutch into English.
Next, we will compare our findings in hospitals with our
findings in specialty clinics to determine whether entre-
preneurship constitutes transformational or sedimented
change, and we will present a refined model explaining
physicians’ entrepreneurship.Results
First, we will establish the nature of intra-organizational
dynamics in hospitals and in clinics. For this purpose,
we will analyze the dynamics for each of the concepts in
the research model: power dependence, interest dissat-
isfaction, value commitment, and entrepreneurship. Fi-
nally, we also provide some additional findings with
respect to hospital entrepreneurship and elaborate on
the type of change associated with the entrepreneurial
process.
Table 1 Specialties and size of clinics included in sample
Hospitals (beds) Clinics (number of physicians)
< 300 400 to 700 400 to 700 > 700 ≤ 10 > 10
Cardiology 1
Dermatology 1 2 1
Geriatrics 1
Gynecology 1 1
Internal medicine 1 1




Plastic surgery 1 1 1
Radiology 1
Surgery 1 1
Total 4 4 4 3 5 7
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We found that all physicians reported experiencing power
dependencies and interest dissatisfaction with management
or colleagues. The perceived high level of bureaucracy and
lack of influence on hospital policy is frequently mentioned
as causing interest dissatisfaction with management. With
respect to this perceived level of involvement in decision-
making, we found differences depending on the size of the
hospital in relation to the management style. For example,
physicians working in the smallest hospital included in our
sample mention the culture of facilitating physicians. In the
three other hospitals, the executive managers deal with mat-
ters differently, using formal and sometimes bureaucratic
decision-making processes. In medium-sized hospital C, for-
mal processes are perceived as dominating:
‘I’ll suggest something and nothing gets done with it,
you’re one month further and you think, oh I never
heard anything more about that. That makes it even
more of an uphill struggle.’ (Manager, hospital C)
In contrast, the management of the other medium-
sized hospital B is more welcoming towards physicians’
initiatives as the executive manager takes a very open,
pragmatic approach towards entrepreneurial initiatives
by physicians, resulting in a relatively high number of
initiatives executed in partnership with the hospital:
‘As a rule, the medical specialists are more
entrepreneurial than the managers. Managers think
more in terms of limitations than physicians do. But if
that’s your attitude (…) you’re literally not able to
start something until you have a project assignment.’
(Executive, hospital B)Finally, the executive manager of the largest hospital
(hospital D) included in our sample created a parallel in-
formal process next to the standard bureaucratic process
to allow for more direct input by physicians:
‘Once every two years the entire Executive Board and
directors and all the medical staff withdraw somewhere
to brainstorm about a number of topics. That works
much better than all that paperwork and it generates
renewed dynamism.’ (Executive, hospital D)
This parallel policy-making process helps physicians ful-
fil their interests. As a result, physicians’ interest dissatis-
faction is relatively low. In addition, in the Netherlands
most physicians work in physicians’ partnerships within a
hospital instead on an employment basis. In fact, most of
these physicians regard an employment relationship with
the hospital as detrimental to their autonomy, causing a
higher level of power dependence compared to an inde-
pendent relationship:
‘I’ve seen several employment relationships go bad in
the hospital because (…) the directors first said yes,
but then no, we mustn’t do this after all. And that
leads to conflicts and in the end the director says,
hang on a minute, I’m the boss here, remember?’
(Physician, hospital D)
Summarizing, all physicians in hospitals experienced
power dependence to some extent. Bureaucracy and a lack
of perceived influence in the decision-making processes of
management are highly influential factors. These factors in
turn are dependent on hospital and partnership size and
the managerial style of the executive manager. Hereby,
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physicians are seen as ways of diminishing physicians’ per-
ceived power dependence. Finally, an employment relation-
ship between physicians and a hospital is regarded as
causing greater power dependence.
For specialty clinics, we found that physicians involved
in the entrepreneurial process and having a position in the
clinic’s governance perceive the facilitation provided by
management as good. A general manager of a specialty
clinic explains his facilitation of physicians as follows:
‘We set up everything to make it as easy as possible
for the physicians to do their job. Indeed, they’re the
boss. In that sense they’re not being ordered around by
a manager. So they have an awful lot of say in how
they can optimize their work and arrangements.’
(Manager, clinic #3)
However, in clinics, organizational size also appears to
be positively related to power dependence as physicians
working in larger clinics mention power dependence more
frequently. In contrast, respondents from smaller clinics
experience more direct collaboration by being more cen-
trally positioned within the organization. A manager of
the largest clinic reports the downside of a large span of
control:
‘People always complain a lot. And the complaints are
mainly about how remote the directors are - not me,
but the directors: people think they are too distant.’
(Manager, clinic #2)
In addition to organizational size, the single focus in
most clinics on one specialty improved the perceived in-
fluence on organizational decision-making. As a result,
internal competition with other specialties is limited or
absent. This focused character contributes to a lower
perceived power dependence.
Moreover, perceived power dependence is reduced by
the financial incentives provided by specialty clinics.
These incentives are related to the overall performance,
thereby fostering a shared interest among physicians and
managers alike. As a physician explains:
‘We set up the clinic to give everyone a share in the
profits. That makes you slightly more motivated to
make sure things work out in your own outfit because
it’s in your own interests.’ (Physician, clinic #4)
With regard to physicians who were not involved in
the entrepreneurial process of starting up the clinic and
who are not included in the clinic’s governance, our re-
sults indicate that they still perceive high power depend-
ence on management. In contrast, physicians who wereinvolved in the startup phase and who are part of the gov-
ernance structure of the specialty clinic perceive them-
selves to be more influential as well as seeing functional
interdependence with - rather than dependence on - man-
agement. This mutual interdependence is perceived as a
positive and vital characteristic of their organization, as a
physician involved in the entrepreneurial process notes:
Summarizing, specific organizational characteristics of
specialty clinics stimulate the development of shared inter-
ests and collaboration. For example, small specialty clinics
without much bureaucracy can be more flexible with re-
gard to physicians’ interests due to a smaller span of con-
trol for the clinics’ management and a decision-making
process that involves a single specialty. In addition, many
specialty clinics offer shared financial incentives, thereby
aligning the interests of physicians and managers. Finally,
physicians who have been involved in the founding of the
clinic and who have a position in the clinic’s governance
experience low levels of power dependence. Both physi-
cians and managers are aware of their interdependence,
which produces a context where physicians are facilitated
in practicing their medical profession as autonomously as
possible.
Interest dissatisfaction
We found mixed results for the causes and extent of inter-
est dissatisfaction among physicians. The causes of interest
dissatisfaction with hospital management are often related
to the perceived degree of red tape in decision-making.
Some managers frankly acknowledge this:
‘I often still need to work on creating the basic
organization, so you don’t even get round to
entrepreneurial activities, you’re too busy managing.’
(Manager, hospital C)
A physician in hospital C explains his experiences with
management:
‘I’ve suggested a couple of really interesting
opportunities to the hospital. But you never hear
anything more about them. (…) I can’t understand
from a rational viewpoint why a hospital doesn’t seize
those opportunities’ (Physician, hospital C)
Good facilitation by management, on the other hand,
was found to limit interest dissatisfaction among physi-
cians, as illustrated by one physician:
‘I would say the answer to the question why I don’t
undertake entrepreneurial activities outside the
hospital is that we basically have a good outpatient
clinic and I’m satisfied with that.’
(Physician, hospital A)
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may also be caused by colleagues, depending on the
relative power dependence experienced with regard to
either hospital management or other physicians. As
most hospital-based physicians work in a partnership
with other physicians, these partners are very import-
ant. Difficulties in this relationship can easily lead to
conflicts and may result in entrepreneurship by the
departing physician, as explained by a physician who
was in the process of starting his own clinic after hav-
ing left the hospital:
‘If there comes a point that it’s blindingly obvious they
want to get rid of you but don’t actually say so, (…)
then I’m not inclined either to say well, I’ll just stay
put. I can’t function if that kind of thing is going on.’
(Physician hospital x)
Summarizing, we found mixed results on the causes
and origins of interest dissatisfaction. Interest dissatis-
faction of hospital-based physicians was related to the
hospital’s bureaucracy and the resulting lack of oppor-
tunity exploration. On the other hand, good facilitation
decreases interest dissatisfaction. Additionally, we also
found an example of one physician with a high degree
of perceived power dependence with regard to his col-
leagues. Due to the problematic relationship, this re-
sulted in interest dissatisfaction with his fellow group
members rather than with management.
In clinics, on the other hand, ten out of twelve physi-
cians said they were satisfied with the facilitation pro-
vided by their management, as they were able to satisfy
their interests and practice their medical profession
while safeguarding their medical autonomy. Especially,
physicians who were involved in the founding and govern-
ance of their specialty clinic reported being able to align
their clinic with their own interests. A general manager
describes how physicians’ interests are facilitated:
‘The physician-entrepreneurs want short lines of com-
munication, a focus on patients, a personal business,
not too big, fast, no waiting, not being constantly
shunted from pillar to post, high-quality service (…).
And the facilities for that are what we’ve essentially or-
ganized.’ (Manager, clinic #4)
The interests of physicians and managers in clinics are
found to be highly aligned, thereby preventing interest dis-
satisfaction and competing interests. Instead, shared inter-
ests focus on achieving high patient satisfaction, and the
best possible care is realized through shared ownership or
financial incentives to optimize the clinic’s overall per-
formance. A general manager described the importance of
having shared interests:‘In fact, you need to make sure the interests of the
doctors and the clinic are aligned. If the interests
aren’t aligned, they will inevitably end up in a
conflict.’ (Manager, clinic #3)
It is noticeable, however, that as clinics grow, physicians
and managers report experiencing a similar divergence of
interests to managers and physicians working in hospitals.
One physician who worked on an employment basis for a
specialty clinic explains his difficult relationship with a
manager:
‘There comes a point where the management tells you,
the doctor, how you should be doing your (…) and then
you gradually get into disagreements with
management.’ (Physician, clinic #7)
Summarizing, physicians who participate in the
founding and governance of the clinic are able to prac-
tice their medical profession while satisfying most of
their interests; they experience low levels of interest
dissatisfaction. Physicians’ interests are aligned with
clinics’ overall performance through shared ownership
or additional financial incentives. As clinics grow,
however, the interests of managers and physicians start
to diverge, thereby creating similar tensions as in
hospitals.
Logics and value commitments
Physicians embedded in the business-like logic or hybrid
logic (containing elements from both the medical and busi-
ness logic) experienced interest dissatisfaction with fellow
physicians exhibiting prima donna behaviour rather than
with hospital management. This results in a transformative
oriented competitive value commitment, aiming to change
the traditionally dominant logic of the own group. A phys-
ician embedded in a hybrid logic illustrates this:
‘I try to communicate in their (managers’) language
and not retreat into my medical ivory tower (…). At
the same time there are an awful lot of doctors with
really unreasonable demands. If someone like that
cries out, “Good gracious, I’m the doctor here, what on
earth are you thinking of?”. If you do that just once,
you’ve lost your commitment for the next five years.’
(Physician, hospital A)
For physicians embedded in the medical logic however,
interest dissatisfaction is related to their perceived high
power dependence on hospital management. Their deci-
sion to engage in entrepreneurship is based on a defensive
oriented competitive value commitment aimed at uphold-
ing values derived from medical professionalism. As one
physician states:
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a simple operation just because that operation didn’t fit
in with the management’s ideas.’ (Physician, hospital B)
Summarizing for hospitals, being embedded in the med-
ical logic is associated with interest dissatisfaction with
hospital management, while being embedded in a hybrid
or business logic is associated with interest dissatisfaction
with fellow physicians.
In clinics, we found a tendency for the development
and maintenance of a shared hybrid logic held by both
physicians and managers as part of the entrepreneurial
process. The basic premise of this hybrid logic entails
both groups adopting elements of the logic traditionally
held by the other group. As a physician describes it:
‘Just as managers need to learn to think a bit like a doctor
- they need to be able to empathize with how doctors think
- in the same way, doctors need to be able to empathize
with how managers think.’ (Physician, clinic #6)
One physician, who held a medical logic, did not partici-
pate in the entrepreneurial process of starting up the clinic
and was not involved in the clinic’s governance collided
with the hybrid logic and eventually left the specialty clinic;
‘I had an office manager there. (…) I said: you need to
facilitate me. And at a certain point, it was something
really simple, I said that I wanted to arrange my
consultation hours like this. “Yes, but we don’t agree.”
Sorry, but if so then we have a misunderstanding.’
(Physician-manager, clinic #7)
In addition, the relatively small size of specialty clinics
helps in building and maintaining a shared hybrid logic as
communication can be quick and direct, as explained by a
manager:
‘We regularly discuss the set of instruments doctors
need, agreeing on communication with patients and
how we should arrange procedures and protocols.’
(Manager, clinic #5)
Finally, as the clinic expands, the business logic of
management becomes more dominant at the expense of
the hybrid logic, potentially giving rise to a defensively
oriented competitive value commitment. A physician
embedded in the hybrid logic described his feelings
about the growth of his clinic:
‘But you see that specialty clinics are getting bigger and
bigger (…) and if they get big enough, you automatically
get the same organizational problems in the specialty
clinics as in the hospitals.’ (Physician, clinic #4)Likewise, the executive manager of hospital B com-
ments on the dangers of the entrepreneurial entity be-
coming more bureaucratic:
‘The management side has a tendency to make things
more bureaucratic, they add a layer of bureaucracy to
the opportunity and if you do that thoroughly then you
inevitably find the opportunity has gone again.’
(Executive Manager, hospital B)
Summarizing, at most of the specialty clinics in-
cluded in our sample, physicians and managers are em-
bedded in a shared hybrid logic. As physicians perceive
their interests to be properly facilitated, their value
commitment is directed towards maintaining this sta-
tus quo. One physician who did not participate in the
entrepreneurial process and the governance of the
clinic collided with the dominant hybrid logic, thereby
developing a defensive oriented competitive value com-
mitment. Finally, we found that as clinics grow, so does
the dominance of the business logic.
Entrepreneurship
Based on our research model, we found two ways in
which intra-organizational dynamics in hospitals con-
tribute to physicians’ entrepreneurship. First, physicians
embedded in the medical logic experience power de-
pendencies and interest dissatisfaction with regard to
management, which induces them to leave the hospital.
Second, physicians embedded in the business logic ex-
perience power dependencies and interest dissatisfac-
tion with regard to other physicians. However, we did
not find examples of physicians embedded in the
business-like health care logic whose decision to turn
into an entrepreneur was induced solely by intra-
organizational dynamics. Instead, we found other fac-
tors influencing physicians’ entrepreneurship. Coming
from an entrepreneurial family facilitates the transition,
as explained by a plastic surgeon embedded in the busi-
ness logic:
‘Ever since I was a child I’ve been brought up in an
entrepreneurial environment (…). And then I started
thinking: well, we could do that here in this hospital
as well; set up our own business and deliver care
privately ourselves.’ (Physician, hospital B)
Another deciding factor for entrepreneurship is having
an entrepreneurial nature, as described by a physician
embedded in the business logic:
‘I turned from being a doctor into an entrepreneur
because it’s in my blood (…) it was just a question of
acting according to your nature.’ (Physician, clinic #9)
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‘Dissatisfaction and criticisms of the senior
management, the Executive Board, confidence issues
and all sorts of things - that can be one of the reasons
for starting entrepreneurial activities. But you need to
be a genuine entrepreneur to actually be able to take
that step.’ (Manager, hospital B)
For physicians already working in entrepreneurial spe-
cialty clinics, we only encountered one physician who
therefore experienced power dependencies and interest
dissatisfaction with regard to management, inducing him
to leave the specialty clinic to start his own business. This
physician was embedded in the medical logic and did not
participate in the entrepreneurial process or in the clinic’s
governance. We neither found evidence for high levels of
power dependencies and interest dissatisfaction with the
clinic’s management among physicians who did partake in
the entrepreneurial process and governance of the clinic,
nor did we encounter similar phenomena with respect to
other physicians. Still, growing bureaucratization is men-
tioned as a potential danger to this stable situation as this
may induce growing dependence on the clinic’s manage-
ment, therefore resulting in interest dissatisfaction.Additional findings on hospitals
An important factor influencing the form of physicians’
entrepreneurship in hospitals is management’s basic atti-
tude towards physicians’ entrepreneurship and manage-
ment’s willingness to facilitate entrepreneurial initiatives
(see Table 2). The management of three of the hospitals in-
cluded in our sample only allows physicians’ entrepreneur-
ship under certain conditions. Examples of these conditions
include the requirement that the new clinic be located at a
minimum distance from the hospital, and shared owner-
ship, often with a majority stake for the hospital. For physi-
cians who are dissatisfied with the facilitation provided by
hospital management, this stance provides additional ‘evi-
dence’ reinforcing this dissatisfaction.
The management of the fourth hospital included in our









Small hospital Low Conditional 1/0
Medium hospital High Positive (vehicle) 5/1
Medium hospital High Conditional 1/2
Large Hospital Low Conditional 1/1large-scale competitor in the neighborhood to create an
entrepreneurial vehicle as part of the hospital’s holding
company structure. This vehicle was able to facilitate physi-
cians attracted by the prospect of starting an entrepreneur-
ial entity. As part of the arrangement, the hospital would
hold a majority stake in every newly created entity.
‘If you see what the specialists do with this, it’s not
that much at hospital B. But what it has done is to
send a message to the staff that (…) we also give them
the freedom to be entrepreneurs. What you also see is
that some specialists are so entrepreneurial that they
say: I’m just going to start up my own businesses.’
(Manager, hospital B)
Indeed, the facilitation provided for entrepreneurial ini-
tiatives has been no panacea preventing physicians from
leaving this particular hospital, as one physician explains:
‘I wasn’t interested in fitting in with a hospital
hierarchy where ophthalmologists are somewhere near
the bottom. It was time for something different, so I
changed direction completely.’ (Physician, hospital B)
In sum, we found most management teams de facto
discourage physicians’ entrepreneurship by setting con-
ditions. For physicians who are already dissatisfied, this
increases their dissatisfaction with hospital management.
In contrast, creating an entrepreneurial vehicle as part of
the hospital may facilitate physicians in carrying out
their initiatives. This, however, is no panacea preventing
entrepreneurial physicians from leaving the hospital.
Resulting type of change in clinics
Next, to assess whether the change to entrepreneurship
was transformational or sedimented, we analyzed intra-
organizational dynamics in specialty clinics. We found
that physicians and managers who jointly started a spe-
cialty clinic developed a hybrid logic during the startup
phase. This hybrid logic subsequently supports their col-
laboration as it becomes the dominant logic once the
clinic is operational. Interestingly, physicians who are not
involved in either the startup or governance of the spe-
cialty clinic still report high perceived power dependence
on, and interest dissatisfaction with, clinic management.
Instead of adopting the dominant hybrid logic, these phy-
sicians remain embedded in their traditional medical logic,
thereby developing a defensive oriented competitive value
commitment towards the hybrid logic. This finding sug-
gests that involvement in the startup phase and govern-
ance itself comprises a sedimentation process, allowing
physicians traditionally embedded in the logic of medical
professionalism to adopt elements of the business-like
health care logic, thereby developing a hybrid logic shared
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namics in both hospitals and specialty clinics is summa-
rized in Table 3.
We found two indications for the change being sedimen-
ted rather than transformational. As part of the medical
logic, physicians are supposed to be centrally positioned in
the organization allowing them to be both influential as
well as autonomous [17]. Being involved in the startup
process and governance of the specialty clinic and subse-
quently having direct influence on clinics’ policies not only
diminishes the likelihood of interest dissatisfaction develop-
ing but also fits well with the initial medical logic in which
most entrepreneurial physicians were initially embedded.
This is supported by a growing body of literature pointing
to the added value of involving physicians in governance
[19,34-39]. In sum, physicians’ satisfaction in specialty
clinics is not a result of a newly created logic resulting
from transformational change, but rather the outcome of
a good fit with the medical logic in which the physician
was formerly embedded and which prevailed during the
entrepreneurial process.
As noted by Pinnington and Morris [29], whereas trans-
formational change is permanent, sedimented change is
temporary and can be reversed. We found this to be the
case with respect to the hybrid logic of small, focused spe-
cialty clinics. As illustrated by Mintzberg [40] and more re-
cently by Marquis and Lounsbury [41], small organizations
tend to turn into bureaucracies as they grow, thereby pro-
viding the conditions for an increasingly dominant business
logic. As organizational growth requires more coordination,
the business logic increasingly becomes dominant, thereby
resembling the very organizations entrepreneurial physi-
cians left in the first place. As a result, organizational mem-
bers with a strong need for autonomy may leave the
specialty clinic [42].
Finally, in specialty clinics physicians’ and managers’ in-
terests are aligned by providing incentives. Shared inter-
ests have been shown to positively affect organizational
performance and collaboration [20,37,38,43-46]. In fact,
these incentives constitute additional cement to the sedi-
ment in which entrepreneurial values are ‘glued’ onto the
central medical logic of physicians. This glue may alsoTable 3 Characteristics of intra-organizational dynamics in ho
8 managers








A < 300 Low Medium Medium
B 400 to 700 High Medium Medium
C 400 to 700 High Low High
D > 700 Low Medium Mediumimprove the fit between managers and physicians in other
settings, like hospitals.
Discussion
We explored the nature of intra-organizational dynamics
between physicians and managers in both hospitals and
specialty clinics. In addition, we assessed whether the
change whereby a physician turns into an entrepreneur
is largely transformational or sedimented.
A perceived high level of bureaucracy and the associated
lack of opportunities for physicians to have a say on hospital
policy were found to cause both perceived power depend-
ence and interest dissatisfaction. In addition to the focus by
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) on intra-organizational
dynamics between functionally different groups leading to
radical change, we also found evidence that intra-group dy-
namics may result in radical change, thereby inducing physi-
cians to turn into entrepreneurs.
The initial embeddedness in a certain logic seems to de-
termine physicians’ value commitment and related primary
focus of perceived power dependence and interest dissatis-
faction. Physicians embedded in the traditional logic of
medical professionalism perceive high levels of bureaucracy
and related power dependence on, and interest dissatisfac-
tion with hospital management, resulting in a defensively
oriented competitive value commitment. Moreover, intra-
organizational dynamics constitute the main incentive for
change, which takes the shape of entrepreneurship. Simul-
taneously, management’s attitudes to these types of initia-
tives by physicians influence how they will be implemented.
If a hospital’s management explicitly discourages entrepre-
neurial initiatives, physicians face no alternative than to
execute their entrepreneurial initiative outside the hospital,
while if management is more facilitating, physicians will
prefer to collaborate with the hospital organization in the
form of intrapreneurship.
As a result, we conclude that our research model holds
for physicians embedded in the logic of medical profes-
sionalism thereby developing a defensively oriented com-
petitive value commitment. This confirms earlier findings
of Marquis and Lounsbury [41], who found entrepreneur-









Low Negative 1 0
Low Positive (Vehicle) 5 1
High Conditional 1 2
Medium Negative 1 1
Table 4 Intra-organizational dynamics in specialty clinics as compared with hospitals
Hospital Specialty clinic
Physicians (n = 15) Physicians (n = 12)
Logic Medical (6) Hybrid (1) Medical (1) Hybrid (6)
Business (8) Business (5)
Participated in startup No Yes
In governance No Yes
Perceived power dependenciesa High Medium High Low
Prime subject of power dependencies Management Fellow physicians/Management Management -
Perceived interest dissatisfactiona High Medium High Low







a‘Low’ when no example regarding perceived interest dissatisfaction or power dependencies is given, ‘medium’ when one or two examples are given, and ‘high’
when more than two examples are given.
Koelewijn et al. Human Resources for Health 2014, 12:28 Page 10 of 12
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/12/1/28Yet, the physicians embedded in the dominant logic of
business-like health care primarily reported interest dis-
satisfaction because of prima donna behaviour of fellow
physicians embedded in the logic of medical profession-
alism unwilling to adapt to hospital policies. Thereby, a
transformative oriented competitive value commitment
is developed towards the traditionally dominant logic of
physicians.
Although we found that intra-organizational dynamics
encouraged entrepreneurship to take place, personal fac-
tors, in particular in the form of an entrepreneurial na-
ture or nurture, were mentioned as incentive necessary
conditions for the entrepreneurship of these physicians.
Finally, our finding that entrepreneurship represents sedi-
mented rather than transformational change provides strik-
ing evidence for hybridized professionalism. As part of this
concept, professionals are linked to other groups holding
different logics [47] calling for new boundary spanning
knowledge and skills. Until now however, hybridization was
defined as professionals learning new behaviour to fit new
and hybrid organizational forms [48]. Our research how-
ever indicates that in the process of resisting hybridization,
new entrepreneurial entities can be found aimed to prevent
hybridization by instead upholding values derived from the
logic of medical professionalism. Surprisingly however, we
found evidence that the entrepreneurial process aimed to
prevent hybridization, instead entails a hybridization
process by which elements of the ‘alien’ logic are adopted
(Table 4).
Study limitations and suggestions for further research
Although this was a qualitative study exploring aspects
of intra-institutional dynamics, the responding selection
of physicians and managers may have biased our find-
ings. Given our relatively limited sample, a large-scale
quantitative follow-up study is needed to confirm our
qualitative findings. It remains unclear how the entre-
preneurial process actually induces physicians to adoptelements from the business logic and how management
is induced to adopt elements from the medical logic,
thereby creating a hybrid logic. A follow-up longitudinal
study should focus on this process of sedimentation and
shed more clarity on the mechanisms involved. Finally,
future research may extend our knowledge on the
hybridization process itself including the mechanisms
by which actors adopt new behaviours and skills.Conclusion
The main theoretical contribution of our paper lies in the
conceptualization of our findings into a theory of entre-
preneurial change in the health care sector. We drew from
the neo-institutional theory developed by Greenwood and
Hinings (1996), which assumed that organizations move
to a coherent logic with a consistent set of structures and
systems. Our analysis demonstrates that the hybrid entre-
preneurial logic can be partially overlapping, consisting of
different, and sometimes conflicting, layers from both the
medical and business logic. As organizations grow, these
layers may shift, thereby providing the impetus for a new
cycle of change.
Rather than representing transformational change, our
findings show that physicians’ entrepreneurship demon-
strates the existence of sedimented change in which a hy-
brid logic held by both managers and physicians allows for
a collaborative health framework in specialty clinics.
Our findings have implications for policy-makers both
at the national level and the hospital level. At the national
level, budget cuts resulting from the enduring economic
downturn in Western countries have provided an impetus
for new and additional health care reforms relying heavily
on the logic of business-like health care. However in order
to be effective, the deep involvement of physicians, decen-
tralized decision-making and common ground with stake-
holders embedded in the medical logic is needed, allowing
for a hybrid logic to develop.
Koelewijn et al. Human Resources for Health 2014, 12:28 Page 11 of 12
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/12/1/28At the hospital level, policy-makers could learn from the
mechanisms employed in specialty clinics. For example,
by closely aligning organizational entities with medical
specialties, management can be more focused and direct,
simultaneously allowing for the greater influence and in-
volvement of physicians. In addition, we found shared in-
centives for both management and physicians, based on
both quality indicators and financial indicators of the
entity’s performance, to be useful in providing additional
cement to the sedimented hybrid logic.
Competing interest
The authors declare that they have no competing interest.
Authors’ contributions
WTK carried out the four case studies of the hospitals and five of the
specialty clinics and participated in the analysis of the results and drafting of
the manuscript. MR conducted seven of the case studies of specialty clinics
and participated in both the analyses of the results and the drafting of the
document. MLE helped to draft the final document. WHH participated in its
design and coordination and helped to draft the manuscript. All authors
read and approved the final manuscript.
Author details
1Department of Health Technology and Services Research, School of
Management and Governance, University of Twente, Drienerlolaan 5,
Enschede 7522, NB, The Netherlands. 2Netherlands Institute for Knowledge
Intensive Entrepreneurship (NIKOS), School of Management and Governance,
University of Twente, Drienerlolaan 5, Enschede 7522, NB, The Netherlands.
Received: 18 October 2013 Accepted: 2 May 2014
Published: 19 May 2014
References
1. NZA: ZBC Monitor: Een kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve analyse. Utrecht: Dutch
Healthcare; 2012. Authority.
2. Health Care Inspectorate IGZ: Het resultaat telt - particuliere klinieken 2009.
Utrecht; 2010.
3. Health Care Inspectorate IGZ: Het resultaat telt - Particuliere Klinieken 2012.
Utrecht; 2013.
4. Bruinsma J: Zelfstandige kliniek als heipaal onder het ziekenhuis.
De Volkskrant 2010, 20–21.
5. Bruinsma J: Privéklinieken doen nu volledig mee. De Volkskrant 2011, 2–3.
6. Piersma J: Privékliniek komt snel uit de marge van de zorgmarkt. Het
Financieele Dagblad 2009, 3.
7. Walburg L: Lijfarts. Het Financieele Dagblad 2011, 11–13.
8. Hopstaken L: Ongericht ondernemen, ziekenhuizen in verwarring.
Zorgvisie 2008, 38:12.
9. Kiers B: ‘Wij dien dit niet uit geldwolverij’-Specialisten belemmerd in hun
ondernemingszin. Zorgvisie 2008, 38:26–31.
10. Saltman RB, Busse R, Mossialos E: Regulating Entrepreneurial Behaviour in
European Health Care Systems. PA: Open University Press Philadelphia; 2002.
11. Kuhlmann E, Burau V, Larsen C, Lewandowski R, Lionis C, Repullo J:
Medicine and management in European healthcare systems: how do
they matter in the control of clinical practice? Int J Clin Pract 2011,
65:722–724.
12. Ranawat AS, Koenig JH, Thomas AJ, Krna CD, Shapiro LA: Aligning
physician and hospital incentives: the approach at hospital for special
surgery. Clin Orthop Relat Res 2009, 467:2535–2541.
13. Cohn KH, Gill SL, Schwartz RW: Gaining hospital administrators’ attention:
ways to improve physician-hospital management dialogue. Surgery 2005,
137:132–140.
14. OECD: Health: Spending Continues to Outpace Economic Growth in Most OECD
Countries. OECD Health Data; 2011 [http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/
healthspendingcontinuestooutpaceeconomicgrowthinmostoecdcountries.htm]
15. Klopper-Kes AHJ, Siesling S, Meerdink N, Wilderom CPM, van Harten WH:
Quantifying culture gaps between physicians and managers in Dutch
hospitals: a survey. BMC Health Serv Res 2010, 10:86–96.16. Kaissi A: Manager-physician relationships: an organizational theory
perspective. Health Care Manag (Frederick) 2005, 24:165–176.
17. Reay T, Hinings CR: Managing the rivalry of competing institutional
logics. Organ Stud 2009, 30:629–652.
18. Scott WR: Institutions and Organizations. 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications; 2001.
19. Witman Y, Smid GAC, Meurs PL, Willems DL: Doctor in the lead: balancing
between two worlds. Organization 2011, 18:477–495.
20. Andrews R: Organizational social capital, structure and performance.
Hum Relat 2010, 63:583–608.
21. Bode I: Processing institutional change in public service provision.
Public Organ Rev 2013, 13:323–339.
22. Degeling P, Zhang K, Coyle B, Xu L, Meng Q, Qu J, Hill M: Clinicians and
the governance of hospitals: a cross-cultural perspective on relations
between profession and management. Soc Sci Med 2006, 63:757–775.
23. Greenwood R, Hinings CR: Understanding radical organizational change:
bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Acad Manag Rev
1996, 21:1022–1054.
24. Koelewijn WT, Ehrenhard ML, Groen AJ, van Harten WH: Intra-
organizational dynamics as drivers of entrepreneurship among
physicians and managers in hospitals of western countries. Soc Sci Med
2012, 75:795–800.
25. Burgelman RA: A process model of internal corporate venturing in the
diversified major firm. Adm Sci Q 1983, 28:223–244.
26. Hisrich RD, Peters MP: Entrepreneurship: Starting, Developing, and Managing
a New Enterprise: Homewood. McGraw-Hill/Irwin: IL; 1992.
27. Shane S, Venkataraman S: The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of
research. Acad Manag Rev 2000, 25:217–226.
28. Cooper DJ, Hinings B, Greenwood R, Brown JL: Sedimentation and
transformation in organizational change: the case of Canadian law firms.
Organ Stud 1996, 17:623–647.
29. Pinnington A, Morris T: Archetype change in professional organizations:
survey evidence from large law firms. Br J Manag 2003, 14:85–99.
30. Kitchener M: Quasi-market transformation: an institutionalist approach to
change in UK hospitals. Public Adm 1998, 76:73–95.
31. Addicott R, Furlie E: Sedimented Archetype Change in Public Sector
Organisations the Example of Managed Clinical Networks for Cancer. Lindfield,
NSW: Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management; 2006.
32. Noordegraaf M: From ‘Pure’ to ‘Hybrid’ professionalism - Present-day pro-
fessionalism in ambiguous public domains. Adm Soc 2007, 39:761–785.
33. Evetts J: The sociological analysis of professionalism - Occupational
change in the modern world. Int Sociol 2003, 18:395–415.
34. Goodall AH: Physician-leaders and hospital performance: is there an
association? Soc Sci Med 2011, 73:535–539.
35. Abernethy MA, Vagnoni E: Power, organization design and managerial
behaviour. Acc Organ Soc 2004, 29:207–225.
36. Scholten G, Van der Grinten T: Integrating medical specialists and
hospitals. The growing relevance of collective organisation of medical
specialists for Dutch hospital governance. Health Policy 2002, 62:131–139.
37. Edwards N: Doctors and managers: poor relationships may be damaging
patients - what can be done? Qual Saf Health Care 2003, 12:i21–i24.
38. Klopper-Kes AHJ, Meerdink N, Wilderom CPM, Van Harten WH: Effective
cooperation influencing performance: a study in Dutch hospitals. Int J
Qual Health Care 2010, 23:94–99.
39. Walston SL, Chou AF: Healthcare restructuring and hierarchical alignment
- Why do staff and managers perceive change outcomes differently?
Med Care 2006, 44:879–889.
40. Mintzberg H: Structure in 5's: A Synthesis of the Research on
Organization Design. Management Science 1980, 26:322–341.
41. Marquis C, Lounsbury M: Vive la résistance: competing logics and the
consolidation of US community banking. Acad Manag J 2007, 50:799–820.
42. Stuart TE, Sorenson O: Liquidity events and the geographic distribution of
entrepreneurial activity. Administrative Science Quarterly 2003, 175–201.
43. Calciolari S, Cantu E, Fattore G: Performance management and goal
ambiguity: managerial implications in a single payer system. Health Care
Manag Rev 2011, 36:164–174.
44. Ommen O, Driller E, Koehler T, Kowalski C, Ernstmann N, Neumann M,
Steffen P, Pfaff H: The relationship between social capital in hospitals and
physician job satisfaction. BMC Health Serv Res 2009, 9:81.
45. Mache S, Vitzthum K, Klapp BF, Groneberg DA: Improving quality of
medical treatment and care: are surgeons’ working conditions and job
Koelewijn et al. Human Resources for Health 2014, 12:28 Page 12 of 12
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/12/1/28satisfaction associated to patient satisfaction? Langenbecks Arch Surg
2012, 397:973–982.
46. Purdy JM, Gray B: Conflicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion, and
multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional fields. Acad Manag J 2009,
52:355–380.
47. Kearney RC, Sinha C: Professionalism and bureaucratic responsiveness -
conflict or compatibility. Public Adm Rev 1988, 48:571–579.
48. Farrell C, Morris J: The ‘neo-bureaucratic’ state: professionals, managers
and professional managers in schools, general practices and social work.
Organization 2003, 10:129–156.
doi:10.1186/1478-4491-12-28
Cite this article as: Koelewijn et al.: Physician’ entrepreneurship
explained: a case study of intra-organizational dynamics in Dutch hospitals
and specialty clinics. Human Resources for Health 2014 12:28.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
